ICANN has terminated domain name registrars accreditation in the past for several issues, many related to non-payment of minimal fees due to ICANN, and record keeping requirements
ICANN has sent out a lot more Notices Of Breach Of the Registrar Accreditation Agreement to registrars for such conduct which got cured by the registrar which basically means the registrars fixed some paperwork and paid past due fees.
Now we are seeing a rash of domain name thefts out of domain holders accounts at the domain registrar level and at the end of the day what is more important; that a domain name registrar failed to pay ICANN past due accreditation fees of $2,725.20 or the fact that domains collectively worth millions of dollars are being stolen out of a registrar?
I put the question mark in to satisfy my more grammatically correct domain blogger brethren , but no question mark is required.
Domain security is the most important service a domain registrar provides and the lack thereof should give rise to De-Accredited faster than anything else.
You might ask where did the amount of $2,725.20 listed about come from?
The non-payment of that amount, is one of the two reasons that ICANN listed in its termination notice of the last domain name registrar ICANN terminated Telefonica Brasil.
In the notice sent to the registrar warning of De-Accredited months before termination ICANN listed as the reasons for its action as:
1. Telefonica’s failure to maintain and provide to ICANN accurate and current information as specified in Section 3.17 of the RAA and the Registrar Information Specification (“RIS”) ; and
2. Telefonica’s failure to pay past due accreditation fees pursuant to Section 3.9 of the RAA in the amount of $2,725.20.
The domain name registrar terminated before Telefonica Brasil was Documentdata Anstalt .
The reasons that domain name registrar was given by ICANN for possible termination were:
1. Failure to maintain and make available to ICANN registration records relating to dealings with Registered Name Holder (“RNH”) of the domain name maramonesse.com, pursuant to Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 of the RAA;
2. Failure to allow the RNH of the domain name maramonesse.com to transfer its domain name registration to another registrar, pursuant to Section 1 of the Inter Registrar Transfer Policy (“IRTP”), or, alternatively, provide a valid reason for denial pursuant to Section 3 of the IRTP.
3. Failure to provide a AuthInfo code within five calendar days of a request
to the RNH for the domain name maramonesse.com, pursuant to Section 5 of the IRTP;
4. Failure to provide domain name data in the specified response format, as required by Section 1.4 of the Registration Data Directory Service (Whois) Specification of the RAA (“Whois Specification”)
5. Failure to provide a description on documentdata Anstalt’s website of renewal fees, post expiration renewal fees (if different) and redemption/restore fees, as required by Section 4.1 of the Expired Registration Recovery Policy (“ERRP”);
6. Failure to send renewal reminder notices at least one month prior to expiration and at least one week prior to expiration, as required by Section 2.1 of the ERRP; and
7. Failure to pay past due accreditation fees, in the amount of $1,382.21
So ICANN will terminate a Registrar for failing to transfer one domain name and if they fail to pay $1,382.21 in fees due to ICANN.
Why isn’t the loss of a domain name by theft, especially when multiple domain names are stolen out of the same registrar grounds for termination?
If allowing thefts of domain names is a reason for termination of a domain name registrar, I haven’t found it as a stated reason in in any notices sent to registrars by ICANN.
Are we speaking about Registrars who stole the domains by transferring them away themselves, or simply very bad security that let third party steal ?
Theft in .com may be reduced if Verisign stepped in and handled change of ownerships. Like Nominet.org.uk does for .uk.
The same Nominet who are currently being investigated by the Information Commissioner’s office in the UK for violating the law (UK and EU) on revealing and accessing personal information?
Yeah, probably not the best entity to hold up as a standard bearer.
Link to a .uk theft and you would have my attention.
Centralizing change of ownership at the Registry level circumvents weaknesses in the Registrar network.
john
in this case, “simply very bad security that let third party steal ?”
Although to Garth’s point Verisign is the one that accepted the court order to transfer domains without even checking the whois to make sure the “defendant” in the court action actually owned the domains before blindly transferring them
Verisign should have checked against the whois and sought injunctive relief against that order.
On the question of domain theft, the underlining system of authorization codes being enough to change ownership should end.
This is a great point and I hope someone asks about this at the next Icann meeting.
@Michael, ah ok thanks . Hmm, once again I must put good word out for Fabulous.com and their “unique” security method (as I say wont say what it is because that adds a layer) .Either way I have NEVER had trouble with Fabulous.com ever in all my years dealing with them. There are a few other good ones, such as Hexonet etc.
Why should a legitimate domain holder be responsible for domain thefts and take all the losses? ICANN and registrars should jointly be liable to losses from any domain thefts caused by hacking. That’s why they are paid for by domain consumers. They should realize they are selling a service to their customers.
Are there certain registrars where thefts are more likely to occur? i think we’d like to know which ones.
Logic would dictate that thefts are more likely to occur at domain registrars where they have already occurred
Read domaining.com for the past couple of weeks and that answer should become obvious
Godaddy is one of the biggest offenders, with FamilyAlbum.com being one of the first mainstream domain names that I heard of, the p2p.com , and others. Never returned to their rightful owners. Then, Godaddy has been heavy in the domain news recently, for domain thefts.
You could argue that Godaddy is the biggest, so there are bound to be disputes. But the record shows that droves of good domain names are hijacked from there.
Oops! The owner of p2p who purchased it in excess of six figures had the thief arrested, and came to terms with the new owner, who also purchased it for excess of six figures, according to the Huffington Post article, When Hackers Steal a Web Address, Few Owners Ever Get It Back.
Here is a PC Mag article about Family Album:
Top Threat: GoDaddy Cancels You
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0%2c2817%2c2100444%2c00.asp
FamilyAlbum.com is a domain of a lifetime. Often, a domain owner doesn’t realize the magnitude of the theft, or he would have fought harder to retrieve it!
Also, Godaddy had something to do with 4chan . . . As soon as something gets popular, the Registrar trys to sieze the domain, or registers the dot com if it was another extension, or hold the domain for ransom . . .
I kept saying, “syndicate.” I keep saying, ICANN-level, to Verisign, to the major Registrars.
If you do a whois on Verisign, it doesn’t return any personable identifiable info about the Registrant, other than dns. If you do a whois on dot org, you get the name and email address of the Registrant. If you do a whois on dot biz or dot us, you get the personable identifiable Registrant info. Dot org and dot us has no issue associating the Registrant with the domain name. Verisign does.
Please People check the difference. For examples, MostWantedDomains dot com and dot org:
Verisign Whois Check
http://www.verisigninc.com/en_US/whois/index.xhtml
Stuff.com
returns:
Domain Name: STUFF.COM
Registrar: 1 API GMBH
Whois Server: whois.1api.net
Referral URL: http://www.1api.net
Name Server: NS0.DNSMADEEASY.COM
Name Server: NS1.DNSMADEEASY.COM
Name Server: NS2.DNSMADEEASY.COM
Name Server: NS3.DNSMADEEASY.COM
Name Server: NS4.DNSMADEEASY.COM
Name Server: NS5.DNSMADEEASY.COM
Status: ok
Updated Date: 09-may-2014
Creation Date: 26-jan-1998
Expiration Date: 25-jan-2016
but the dot org Registry whois
Public Interest Registry WHOIS Lookup
http://pir.org/domains/org-domain
for asset.org
Domain ID: D10106331-LROR
Creation Date: 1999-09-13T09:48:45Z
Updated Date: 2014-09-14T01:21:41Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2015-09-13T09:48:45Z
Sponsoring Registrar:1API GmbH (R1724-LROR)
Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID: 1387
WHOIS Server:
Referral URL:
Domain Status: ok
Domain Status: autoRenewPeriod
Registrant ID:ECW13366085-VHSI
Registrant Name:Worldwide Media Inc
Registrant Organization:Worldwide Media Inc
. . .
for the dot us Registry
Neustar’s .US WHOIS Search
http://www.whois.us/whois-gui
for LowSodium.us (mine)
Neustar returns all the info.
Why do Neustar and PIR.og Registries NOT have a problem with assoiciating the domain with the Registrant, but Verisign keeps it vague? Why? Why? Why?
Dot com is the de facto currency of the internet – that’s for sure! The internet became a multi trillion economy on its own, and dot com domain names rose in value.
The insider collude to separate you from your valuable dot com, whether it has intrinsic value, such as FamilyAlbum.com, or p2p.com, or Retractit.com, or whether it has value from a business which was built on it, has a fine rep and backlinks.
Verisign promotes its extensions: “Learn the importance of getting your business online and how to create an online presence,” and the importance of being online and having your own domain name.
On the other hand, it colludes with Registrars to separate you from your value domain, and to resell your reputation back into the aftermarket, by muddying the ownership of leasee info on its whois search.
“A domain name is key to doing just about anything on the Internet.”
Then why why why make the whois ambiguous, Verisign?
Plus, ICANN intends to overhaul the whois. There is too much incriminating info publicly available to link the real owner to his domain name. ICANN intends to make whois more secretive and confusing than ever!
Verisign ex-employees have fanned out. One is CEO of Moniker. Recently, one was named to board of PIR, and one to Neustar.
Talk about, “there goes the neighborhood!”
I didn’t realize it was that bad. I knew about the hijacked godaddy account that went along with the @N twitter stolen handle. Might be time to think about switching. I’ve threatened them in the past due to other issues.
You can read a few compaint headlines at:
http://www.ripoffreport.com/reports/directory/godaddy-com